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CPE DIRECT

INVESTOR VIEWS OF
AUDIT ASSURANCE:
RECENT EVIDENCE OF
THE EXPECTATION GAP
What do investors expect from an audit?
by Marc J. Epstein and Marshall A. Geiger

shift away from verifying all transactions
and amounts for purposes of fraud detection to determining fairness in financial
statement reporting. This shift partly was
a response to the burgeoning volume of
business activity (making fraud detection
less feasible) and the appearance and increased imi)ortance of a new business player—the shareholder. Corporate shareholders and other outside parties became increasingly reliant on auditors to attest to
management-provided information, necessitating a shift in the primary audit objective to providing assurance on externally
reported financial information.
EVOLUTION OF THE AUDIT
Current practice has not strayed far
In the early years of the U.S. auditing profession—from 1850 to the early 1900s—au- from that of early corporate America, with
ditors primarily were engaged to provide the primary audit focus on financial statealmost absolute assurance against fraud ment reasonableness. Current standards
and intentional mismanagement. As corpo- still reflect the matenal misstatement forate America gi'ew and the auditing pro- cus and increasingly have relied on the confession developed, the early 1900s saw a cept of "reasonable assurance" in de})icting
the level of reliance to be placed on audited
information. One need only skim current
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nvestors and financial statement users long
have agi'eed on the usefulness of the audit
in financial reporting. Over time, however,
auditors have been expected to provide assurance in varying degi-ees and for different purposes. Differences in perception—
especially regarding assurances provided—between users, preparers and auditors
have been termed the "expectation gap."
This article provides some startling evidence of the existence of such a gap in investor perceptions of the assurance provided by an audit.
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larities, all I'ely on the concept of reasonable assurance.
Regardless of professional standards,
however, an important question for the
profession is, What assurance does the
public currently expect auditors to provide? As a profession, CPAs continually
must assess public reaction to their stated
role in financial reporting as well as determine the public's perception of the type
and level of assurances believed or desired
to be provided by auditors.
THE ASSURANCE PROBLEM

The expectation gap has plagued the public
accounting profession almost from inception. Yet the profession has tried to minimize the disparity. From 1945 to 1950, the
American Institute of Accountants (an
American Institute of CPAs predecessor)
undertook an active campaign to enlighten
the public to the public accountant's "true"
responsibility. Around this time, the profession began to clarify communications to
the public regarding its self-pei'ceived re-

sponsibility. Specifically, the standard auditor's report was modified in 1948 to communicate better to the public what an audit
was and to present the auditor's opinion
more clearly. In 1950, over 70,000 co])ies of
a pamphlet describing an audit, audit reports and auditor responsibilities were distributed to banks and other groups interested or involved in financial reporting.
These early efforts were the profession's attempts to hring public perception
in line with the profession's notion of its
role. Recent efforts have focused on both
public opinion and changing professional
standards to bridge the gap.
THE NEW SASs

A battery of expectation gap SASs were issued in 1988 partly to address public criticism of the auditing profession and partly
to provide increased levels of service to audit clients and the public. Although several
of the SASs depict auditor responsibility in
terms of the reasonable assui-ance concept,
two are especially germane. SAS no. 58,
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EXPECTATION GAP
Reports on Audited Fmancial Statements,
requires a new standard audit report including an explicit statement that an audit
provides reasonable assurance for reliance
on the fairness of the financial statements.
SAS no. 53 increases the auditor's responsibility to design an audit to provide reasonable assurance that material errors and
irregularities will be detected.
The statement added to the new audit
report is a culmination of almost 20 years
of effort to establish reasonable assurance
as a basis for the standard report. In 1972,
the AICPA committee on auditing procedure proposed a modified audit report to
address what its members believed were
differences in intended and perceived audit report messages. The proposed report
included the notions of materiality, testing and reasonable assurance, but it eventually was withdrawn due to anticipated
negative public reaction. Several intermittent attempts to alter the standard audit
report also tried to include reasonable assurance in a new report. SAS no. 58 embodies the intent of these early proposals
with an explicit reference that communicates to readers that an audit provides
reasonable assurance of financial statements' material accuracy.
While SAS no. 58 communicates more
explicitly the level of assurance an audit is
intended to provide, SAS no. 53 says auditors have a responsibility to design audits
to provide reasonable assurance that all
material misstatements will be detected.

Former standards had required auditors to
plan an audit to search for material errors
and irregularities. Together, these SASs
I'einforce both internally and externally the
concept of reasonable assurance and the intention that an audit provide such a level of
assurance to users.
SHAREHOLDER VIEWS

We recently conducted a national survey
of investors to gather information on their
views of various aspects of financial reporting issues. F^articipants were selected
if they owned 100 or more shares of a
stock listed on the American or New York
stock exchanges. In total 24() responses
were obtained, representing individuals
from all 50 states.
Two separate questions asked investors
what level of assurance they believed auditors should provide for detecting material
misstatements as a result of error (unintentional misstatements) and as a result of
fraud (intentional misstatements). The anticipated typical response was reasonable
assurance. However, investors held auditors to a much higher level of assurance.
The exhibit on page 64 gives the results of
both questions.
For material misstatement due to erI'ors, only about 51% of the investors believed they should receive reasonable assurance. Approximately 47% wanted absolute assurance financial statements are
free of material misstatements due to errors. This unexpected result clearly is in

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• FOR MANY YEARS A GAP HAS
existed between the assurances auditors
provide on management-compiled financial information and the expectations of
investors and other financial statement
users.
• RECENT EFFORTS TO CLOSE the
expectation gap have focused on influencing public opinion and changing professional standards to ensure an audit is
designed to provide reasonable assurance that material errors, irregularities
and misstatements in financial statements will be detected.
• A SURVEY OF INVESTORS found
they held auditors to a high level of assurance. Almost half expected complete
or absolute assurance that material financial statement errors would be de-
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tected. Over 70% expected absolute assurance that material misstatement due
to fraud would be detected.
• IF INVESTORS EXPECT AND the
courts begin to uphold a standard of absolute assurance, audit liability inevitably will increase. As a result, the
profession should devote substantial resources to increasing public understanding of an audit's nature and its inherent
limitations.
• WHILE A VARIETY OF MEANS
are available for bridging the expectation gap, including increased public
awareness and education, the most immediate is through ailherence to current
audit standards. Auditors should be
more sensitive to the possible existence
of fraud in every audit they conduct.

EXPECTATION GAP

Investor perceptions of audit assurance
The auditor should do whatever investigation is necessary so he or
she can provide assurance the audited financial statements are free
from material misstatements. This assurance should be described as
follows:

No assurance necessary

Error

Fraud

1.67%

2.51%

Reasonable assurance

51.05

26.36

Absolute assurance

47.28

71.13

opposition to the levels of assurance stated
in the auditor's report and in current professional standards.
As surprising as these results are, they
pale in comparison with the high assurance
levels sought for fraud detection. Over TO'^
of investors believe auditors should be held
to absolute assurance for detecting matenal misstatement due tu fraud. The profession, in SAS no. 53, formally recognizes
that frauds and intentional misrepresentations, even if material, are more difficult to
detect than misstatements due to errors.
Nevertheless, investors seemingly set
the assurance standard for detection of
fraud higher than that for detection of errors—both of which exceed current professional standards. Hence, the profession's
perception that an audit should provide
reasonable assurance of financial statement accuracy is held by only a minority of
investors. In sum, the majority of investors
want from an audit absolute assurance the
financial statements are fi'ee of all types of
material misstatement.
BRIDGING THE GAP

The findings unmistakably reveal an expectation gap between auditors and investors on the level of assurance an audit
provides. The evidence suggests investors
seek very high levels of financial statement assurance. Auditors should not only
be interested in but also be aware of these
shareholder perceptions. The litigious environment in which CPAs operate mandates that we. intlividually and as a profession, monitor public opinion and attitudes toward the level of services and assurance provided.
If investors expect, and courts begin to
uphold, a standard of absolute assurance,
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audit liability inevitably will increase substantially. Thus, it is necessary from both
societal and professional perspectives that
CPAs try to narrow the expectation gap.
To do so, however, both groups need to become active agents for change.
The gap may be narrowed partly
through increased public understanding of
an audit's nature and its inherent limitations. The AICPA should devote substantial resources to explaining to the public
the auditor's current role in the financial
reporting process and an audit's inevitable
limitations. Increased educational efforts
with clients and audit committees, at
shareholder meetings, in professional and
civic organizations and at every available
juncture should be used to communicate an
audit's merits and limitations. Our survey
found that, in general, the more educated
an investor was regarding accounting, finance and investment analysis—including
the use of the auditor's report—the less
likely he or she was to require absolute auditor assurance. Hence, increased awareness and education seem to be viable ways
to bridge the gap.
Accordingly, an additiitnal way of educating the public is through continued use
of the new audit report explicitly indicating reasonable assurance. Since the report
has been used for a relatively short period
of time, it may take longer for the new
messages to affect public perception sufficiently. Standard setters should continuously evaluate the autlit report's communicative effectiveness by testing wording
changes on investors, bankers, educators,
government and court officials to learn
how the audit repoit affects perceptions of
the assurances provided and not provided
by an audit. However, reliance on the audit report alone to educate report users
will not be sufficient to have an impact on
user perceptions.
A supplemental educational medium
that may be used is the 1989 AICPA pamphlet. Understanding Aiuiita and the Auditor's Report: A Guide for Finaiicinl
Statement Users. Unfortunately, the pamphlet has not attained widespread distribution and, accordingly, its educational impact has been minimal. Substantially increased dissemination would be advantageous in presenting auditor views and providing a foundation for discussion that
eventually might lead to a nai-rowing of the
gap. Hut individual shai-t'luilders are not
likely to read this publication unsolicited.
A more direct approach to increasing

EXPECTATION GAP
user awareness of the audit function was
suggested by Robert Mednick. (See "The
Auditor's Role in Society: A New Approach to Solving the Perception Gap,"
JofA, Feb.86, page 70.) He proposed a
supplemental "report" to accompany the
audit report describing in plain English an
audit's usefulness, the assurances provided and the limitations. Such a report essentially would summarize the information in the AICPA pamphlet but would be
substantially condensed and much more
visible and useful to all fmancial information users.
Since messages of this type, no matter
how positively worded, could become
tainted if promulgated by the AICPA, the
Securities and Exchange Commission
should be encouraged to develop a similar
unbiased report to be presented with registrants' fihngs and financial statements.
An SEC communication regarding the audit function and the assurances provided
may be more convincing to financial statement users than one emanating from auditors. A SEC requirement, however, will
not be effective for smaller and nonpublicly traded entities.
The profession lacks an easily accessible
fraud database. Development and dissemination of a national database on perpetrated frauds and the effective and efficient
methods of detecting various frauds would
increase audit effectiveness. Since financial
statement users seek high levels of assurance, fraud-detection techniques and their
appropriate use should be readily available
to all auditors. If they were, fraud audits
might become more prevalent or even routine as part of the service package offered
by auditors.
The audit risk model in SAS no. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an
Audit, suggests overall audit risk (in terms
of the overall level of assurance provided
by an audit) can be reduced through increased substantive testing. Another way
to address the gap is to offer a range of audit services (including fraud audits) with
various levels of assurance. During the
shareholders' meeting, investors could be
offered an array of applicable services and
approximate costs. They then could decide
for themselves what level of assurance
they are willing to pay for each year. This
would serve not only to educate investors
to an audit's inherent limitations but also
to enlighten them to the relative costs for
increased audit work that would lead to increased levels of assurance.
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The most immediate means of bridging
the gap is simply through adherence to
current audit standards. The important
message behind SAS no. 53 is auditors
should be more sensitive to the possible
existence of material irregularities
(frauds) in every audit. Heightened audit
sensitivity to management honesty and integrity not only will affect overall audit
performance but also will produce audits
that provide the highest levels of assurance currently possible for the detection of
all misstatements.
In the long term, to move toward bridging the expectation gap the audit profession needs to expand services and undergo
a fundamental change in attitude from selfdefense-self-preservation to meeting society's expectations. This shift is beginning
to take place already. Such a reorientation
also means an expansion of services, including more work to detect frauds and
more internal control audits and disclosures. It also means more opportunities to
• Increase the quality and diversity of
audits.
• Increase the scope of services provided and, accordingly, firm revenues.
• Decrease liability exposure due to not
meeting existing user demands.
To close the gap more completely, however, the audit profession and financial
community need to reexamine the fundamental role of an audit in society and to be
sure financial statement preparers, users
and auditors all are in agreement. As long
as users and auditors continue to have different understandings of what "present
fairly" according to generally accepted accounting principles really means, the expectation gap will remain and auditors will
continue to be faced with lawsuits.
HARP TO IMPLEMENT

Some of these suggestions may be hard to
implement. However, until substantial
changes occur the expectation gap will persist and the litigation explosion will continue to plague CPAs as injured shareholders
argue accountants "should have known" a
stock's price was going to fall or a fraud
had been committed.
Investor views should serve as a reminder to the profession and individual auditors that professional audit standards do
not dictate public opinion. Misconceptions
and differences in expectations—not to
mention the current litigious environment—will persist unless effectively and
timely addressed.
•

